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Abstract
Purpose – This paper seeks to examine the effects of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance on
the nature of financial restatements in Malaysia and whether corporate governance characteristics are
associated with financial restatements.
Design/methodology/approach – Data for this paper are obtained from annual reports that had
been restated for the period of 2002-2005 with firm-years being the unit of observation. A control group
comprising non-restating firms is formed using match-pair procedures where restated and non-restated
firms are matched by size, industry, exchange board classification, and financial year end. The data are
subsequently analyzed using a t-test, the Pearson correlation and logistic regression.
Findings – The results show that the primary reason for misstating the accounts is to inflate
earnings. The nomination committee of the firms that restated is found to be less independent with
higher managerial ownership. The logistic regression analysis indicates that the extent of ownership
by outside blockholders deters firms from misstating accounts. Surprisingly, audit committee
independence is associated with the likelihood of financial misstatement. Financial restatements,
nevertheless, are not found to be associated with board independence, managerial ownership, and CEO
duality. Finally, the results show that firms with high level of debts are more likely to commit in
financial misstatement.
Practical implications – The research is significant as it provides evidence on the role of corporate
governance, especially the independence of the nomination committee and extent of ownership by
outside blockholders in Malaysia. It shows that outside blockholders is effective in disciplining
managers so that the accounts so prepared are not misleading. The move in 2007 by the Malaysian
Government to require companies audit committee to be composed of only independent and
non-executive directors, as well as requiring audit committee members to be financially literate, should
be seen as important in ensuring the effectiveness of the audit committee.
Originality/value – This research is considered as the first study which examines the effects
of corporate governance variables on the incidents of financial restatements in a developing country.
The findings of this paper would be useful for policy makers in evaluating the importance of corporate
governance in emerging countries, specifically on the issue of quality financial reporting.
KeywordsFinancial reporting, Boards of Directors, Audit committees, Malaysia, Corporate governance,
Corporate ownership
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The issue of financial restatements[1] continues to gain prominence as the number of
restatements continued to grow following high profile cases in the recent past that left
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investors with substantial losses. The US General Accounting Office or GAO (2002),
renamed Government Accountability Office in 2004, estimated that between January
1997 and June 2002, accounting restatements in the USA have caused market
capitalization to lose around US$100 billion. Between July 2002 and September 2005,
a further US$36 billion was lost in market capitalization in the days around the initial
restatement announcement (GAO, 2006). Enron, for example, announced US$618 million
loss in its 2001 third quarterly report. A few weeks following this announcement, Enron
disclosed that it had to restate earnings for the previous several years (Sridharan et al.,
2002). As a result, the value of Enron’s shares dropped from its highest US$90 per share
(or about US$60 billion in total) to only cents, resulting in a paper loss of US$90 billion to
its shareholders.
Reasons for financial restatements vary, and restatements, especially when frauds
are involved, have raised significant concerns about the adequacy of corporate
governance and financial disclosure oversight (GAO, 2002). Research shows that there is
a link between corporate governance practices and the incidence of financial
restatements (for example, see Efendi et al., 2004). Coffee (2005) argues that differences in
the structure of ownership led to differences in the nature of corporate scandals and the
incidents of restatements. Comparing corporate scandals in the USA and Europe,
he suggests that “dispersed ownership systems of governance are prone to the forms of
earnings management that occurred in the USA but concentrated ownership systems
are much less vulnerable” to those forms. In Europe, the controlling shareholders tend to
exploit the private benefits of controls through misappropriation of assets (Coffee, 2005).
This also explains why in the USA the incidents of financial restatements are quite
common (Huron Consulting Group, 2003, 2005; GAO, 2002, 2006), while in Europe,
financial restatements are rare (Coffee, 2005). Studies by the GAO in the USA show that
between January 1997 and June 2002, there were 919 cases of restatements reported;
1,390 cases between July 2002 and September 2005, and another 396 cases for the period
between October 2005 and June 2006 (GAO, 2002, 2006).
For public companies, corporate governance is regarded as one of the mechanisms
that could effectively safeguard the interests of a firm’s shareholders. Agency theory
views that managers do not always act in the best interests of the shareholders; they
have incentives to expropriate the firm’s assets, for instance, by undertaking projects
that benefit themselves, at the expense of shareholders’ wealth ( Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), known as a moral hazard
problem. Corporate governance is thus seen as an enabler to ensure an effective check
and balance system, so that management acts in accordance with shareholders’
interests. Thus, corporate governance acts as a tool to discipline, scrutinize, and monitor
management.
The high profile cases of restatements that are caused by pervasive accounting and
financial irregularities, such as the case of Enron and WorldCom in the USA, have led to
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the adoption of new corporate
governance rules for exchange listed firms by the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) in November 2003. The fact that regulators
have placed greater emphasis on strengthening corporate governance standards in the
aftermath of major financial statement frauds suggests that regulators view corporate
governance rules as an important mechanism in deterring financial statement frauds
(Persons, 2005) and hence restatements.
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Given its significant impact, financial restatement is a very important issue and has
received considerable attention from academicians, regulators, and practitioners.
However, most studies on financial restatements are carried out in developed economies.
Eilifsen and Messier (2000), for example, note that most studies investigating the nature
of misstatements are done in the USA and that only two studies (i.e. Chan and Mo, 1998;
Eilifsen et al., 2000) examine non-Anglo-American settings. Another recent study is that
by Young et al. (2008a) in Taiwan. Its pervasiveness, therefore, warrants studies in
various countries (Flanagan et al., 2008). Each country is unique with regard to the
regulatory and cultural frameworks, as well as the ownership patterns. Compared to
developed countries, the ownership structure in Malaysia is interesting because each
listed company must have at least 25 percent of their shares being held by the public
(Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement, 2006). With such rules in place, certain parties,
such as a family founder of the firm or other connected parties, would still dominate and
control the decision-making process for the reason that the three quarters of shares could
be in their hands (Pascoe and Rachagan, 2005).
The objectives of this study, hence, are twofold. First, this study seeks to explore the
nature of financial restatements among Malaysian public listed companies, i.e. the
extent of financial restatements in Malaysia, the types of restatements or items in
financial statements that are commonly misstated, and the reasons of restatements.
Second, this study aims to investigate whether corporate governance characteristics
such as board structure and ownership structure are associated with the incident of
financial restatements.
Data for this study are obtained from the restated annual reports for the period of
2002-2005, with firm-years being the unit of observation. For regression analysis
purposes, a control group is formed using match-pair procedures where restated and
non-restated firms are matched by size, industry, exchange board classification and
financial year end. Given the different regulatory and cultural environments, our
evidence will provide insights as to the extent and causes of financial restatement in this
country. The findings of this study could be useful for regulatory bodies such as the
Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission (SC) as well as the Malaysian Institute of
Corporate Governance, for policy deliberations purposes. The findings contribute to the
corporate governance literature by suggesting that outside blockholders are effective in
disciplining managers and hence improve the financial reporting of the firm. This is
consistent with Yeo et al. (2002) and Dechow et al. (1996).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Next, a section on the Malaysian
context is presented, followed by literature review and hypothesis development.
A section outlining the research methodology is provided in the subsequent section.
This is then followed by the findings and discussion, and finally a section on the
conclusions will follow.
The Malaysian context
In Malaysia, the issue of financial restatements has received considerable attention from
the regulators, especially in recent years where many cases have been discovered and
made public. The cases of financial restatements are usually reported in the business
section of the local newspapers. Table I shows companies which had been directed to
restate their accounts by the SC[2].
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Though the evidence in Table I does not suggest financial restatement incidents are
rampant, it has to be addressed as it affects investor’s confidence in Malaysian
companies. One of the major initiatives instituted by the government was the issuance of
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) by the SC in 2000. The code was
subsequently revised in 2007. The code is adapted from the UK’s Hampel Report.
Since corporate governance reforms in Malaysia are adopted and adapted from the
Anglo-American setting (Liew, 2007), it is therefore interesting to examine whether
the incidence of financial restatement in Malaysia is also similar or dissimilar to those in
the USA.
The MCCG, inter alia, stresses the need for board independence to ensure
transparency and accountability of management. Hence, the MCCG recommends
that independent non-executive directors make up at least one-third of the board
memberships. The MCCG defines independence as being free from the influence of
management and of the significant shareholders of the firm. In a similar vein, Section
166A (3) of the Malaysian Companies Act (1965) stipulates that directors of a company
need to ensure that the accounts of the company have been made out in accordance with
the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board approved accounting standard (known as
Financial Reporting Standards effective from January 1, 2006).
MCCG identifies six specific responsibilities of directors; one of which is to review
the adequacy and the integrity of the company’s internal control systems and
management information systems, including systems for compliance with applicable
laws, regulations, rules, directives, and guidelines. This responsibility expects directors,
both independent and executive directors, to be conversant in the firm’s systems,
including the accounting systems that generate the accounts and financial statements.
Company Restatements
CSM Corporation Bhd Directed by the SC in 2002 to restate its 1999 financial
statements (Securities Commission, 2002)
OilCorp Bhd Directed by the SC to restate its 2004 financial statements
(Securities Commission, 2005)
Aktif Lifestyle Bhd Directed by the SC to restate its 2002 and 2003 financial
statements (Securities Commission, 2005)
Goh Ban Huat Bhd Ordered by the SC to reissue its 2004 fourth quarter
report after being found overstating the profits by
RM121 million (Securities Commission, 2005)
Celcom Bhd (a subsidiary of Telekom
Malaysia Bhd)
The auditor discovered fictitious invoices issued to
the Group amounting to RM259.32 million
(about USD70 million)
Transmile Group Misstatement was discovered in a special audit that the
Company has inflated its revenue by RM522 million for
financial years 2004-2006. Additional RM341 million and
RM189 million of invalid transactions were also
discovered during the period. As a result, the price of
Transmile’s share declined from RM15 to RM2 per share,
resulting in a total paper loss, thus far, of RM3.4 billion
BBS Consortium Bhd, Karensoft
Technology Bhd, Paxelent Corp Bhd, and
Lityan Holdings Bhd
Substantial discrepancies between unaudited and
audited results (Oh, 2005)
Table I.
Recent cases of
restatements in Malaysia
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Thus, if the directors fulfill these duties effectively, the likelihood of errors in the
financial statement is reduced. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a high number of
non-executive directors means a more a board would be more effective in monitoring
managerial opportunism.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Definition of financial restatements is generally viewed as corrections made to the
financial statements due to non-compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles (Palmrose and Scholz, 2000; Efendi et al., 2004; Myers et al., 2004). The GAO
(2002, p. 1) states that “A financial statement restatement occurs when a company, either
voluntarily or prompted by auditors or regulators, revises public financial information
that was previously reported.” Huron Consulting Group (2003)[3] reports three primary
causes of accounting errors: problems in applying the accounting rules, human and
system errors, and fraudulent behaviors. In their 2004 study, they find the leading causes
of restatements to be revenue recognition, equity accounting, reserves, accruals, and
contingencies (Huron Consulting Group, 2005). Empirical studies are consistent with
these findings: income-increasing motivation (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991); debt
covenant constraints (Efendi et al., 2007; Dechow et al., 1996; Richardson et al., 2002); and
diffuse ownership (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991). It is also noted that corrections
involving prior year earnings are less frequent for understatements compared to
overstatements of earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991). Firms that corrected
previously reported quarterly earnings are found to be smaller, less profitable, with high
debt levels, slower growth, and facing more serious uncertainties (Kinney and McDaniel,
1989). The result is consistent with the findings by Ku-Ismail and Abdullah (2010) who
find that companies that defer the recognition of the exceptional items, a tool used to
manipulate quarterly earnings to the fourth quarter tend to be smaller and less
profitable. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that have a CEO who also serves
as board chairman (Efendi et al., 2007; Persons, 2005). Similarly, Lin et al. (2006) find only
size of audit committee is associated with restatements, while its independence,
expertise, activity, and stock ownership of the committee, on the other hand, are not.
As such, the role of corporate governance in monitoring financial restatement needs to be
strengthened.
Studies reveal that there is a large negative market reaction following
the announcement of earnings restatements (for example, Richardson et al., 2002;
Akhigbe et al., 2005). Restatements have caused concern regarding the quality of
financial reporting (Levitt, 1998; Palmrose and Scholz, 2000). However, despite the
negative publicity from misstatement, it is noted that restating firms do not appear
to adopt a more conservative financial reporting strategy following restatement
(Moore and Pfeiffer, 2004). Also, a decline in investor confidence regarding financial
reporting following restatements is only short-term; and that suspicion regarding
the information loss of post-restatement earnings in the long-term is unfounded
(Wilson, 2008). Nevertheless, Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) find that directors and audit
committee members were more likely to exit in restatement firms. Srinivasan (2005) also
finds that directors experience significant labour market penalties when their companies
experience financial restatements.
Several subsequent studies have examined the role of corporate governance
and restatements (such as Klein, 2002; Aier et al., 2005; Srinivasan, 2005;
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Marciukaityte et al., 2009). However, the results are mixed. It is argued that the
restatement arises because of weak governance structure (Flanagan et al., 2008). On the
other hand, some studies find no evidence on the relationship between corporate
governance elements and restatements (for example, Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).
Financial restatement and board independence
Studies investigating the role of the board of directors generally reveal that its
independence is an important characteristic for its effectiveness (see, for example,
Kosnik, 1987; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). It has been shown that
board independence is associated with less likelihood of financial frauds (Beasley, 1996),
less earnings management (Chtourou et al., 2001; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005).
However, having more independent directors does not necessarily lead to an effective
board (Mace, 1986; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Ho and Wong, 2001; Gul and Leung, 2002)
and in fact it can still lead to on financial restatements (Baber et al., 2005). In Malaysia,
extant evidence linking board independence, a measure of board monitoring intensity
with firm’s performance, is not conclusive. For instance, the study by Abdullah (2004)
demonstrates that non-executive directors do not influence a firm’s financial
performance. In another study, Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir (2004) document evidence
of insignificant association between board independence and discretionary accruals,
a proxy for earnings management. Mohd-Saleh et al. (2005) also document similar
findings. Thus, it appears to suggest that non-executive directors in Malaysia are not
seen to be effective in constraining managerial manipulative acts.
Misstatements or financial restatements, however, unlike earnings management,
could lead to a bad reputation to the independent directors, who are argued to be expert
in decision controls (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Kosnik (1987, 1990) also argues that
independent directors are more ready to use their power during crisis. Weisbach (1988)
also documents the likelihood of the board to remove CEOs is higher when the board is
independent of management and when the firm profitability is declining. Beasley (1996)
shows that the incident of financial frauds is associated negatively with board
independence. Dechow et al. (1996) document a link between violations in accounting
that were subjected to Securities and Exchange Commission accounting enforcement
actions and management-dominated boards. In Malaysia, evidence by Mohd-Nasir and
Abdullah (2004) shows that board independence is associated with greater voluntary
disclosure levels among distressed firms. Thus, the evidence seems to confirm the
argument by Kosnik (1987, 1990).
The main objective of appointing independent directors is to bring their expertise and
knowledge to the companies. It is expected that independent director’s skills would
make the company more transparent. Nevertheless, the independent directors face a very
high risk if they fail to carry out their duties properly. With such a liability, they need to
avoid acting merely as rubber stamp for management. It is found that the more vigilant
the independent directors are, the better the accounting conservatism is (Wei et al., 2008).
In fact, the independence of the board of directors is associated with more effective
monitoring activities by the board, following the issuance of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002
(Marciukaityte et al., 2009). Since, financial restatements affect adversely the board
integrity and the reputation of independent directors, it is expected that the extent to
which the board is independent is associated negatively with the incident of financial
restatement. Thus, the maintained hypothesis is as follows:
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H1. There is a negative association between financial restatement and board
independence.
Financial restatement and independence of the nominating committee
MCCG (Finance Committee, 2007) recommends listed firms to establish nominating
committees composed wholly of non-executive directors, the majority of whom are also
truly independent. The nominating committee recommends to the board candidates for
all directorships, as well as candidates proposed by the CEO or by any other senior
executive or any director or shareholder. The committee also recommends to the board
of directors who will fill the seats on the board committees. The nominating committee
also needs to determine annually the required mix of skills and experience and other core
competencies that non-executive directors should have. In addition, the nominating
committee is expected to evaluate annually the effectiveness of the board as a whole, the
board committees and the contribution of each director. Thus, though the role of
nominating committee has not been examined extensively, Brown and Caylor (2004)
find that the link between nominating committee independence and firm performance
is superior to the link between board independence and firm performance, as indicated
by the correlation coefficients. Therefore, from their evidence, it seems that the
independence of the nominating committee is more important than board independence.
The importance of the nominating committee independence is due to the fact it is the
committee which has the specific roles of nominating nominees for new directors and to
evaluate the board as well as individual directors’ performance.
The nominating committee should be composed wholly of independent directors
to ensure its objectivity (US Congress, 2002; revised MCCG, Finance Committee, 2007).
The objective of the appointment outside director to the committee is to safeguard
shareholder rights (Vafeas, 1999). The quality of the candidates for directorships
depends on nominating committee independence and the board committees. Hence, the
more independent the board is, the more likely it is for the board to have independent
directors who are independent and well conversant in accounting. Thus, the hypothesis
is as follows:
H2. There is a negative association between financial restatement and nominating
committee independence.
Financial restatement and independence of the audit committee
The fact that the audit committee is a committee of the board, it is argued, could lead
to the audit committee becoming ineffective as it does not have the power to improve
the firm’s financial reporting process without the board’s consent. Thus, it is argued
that audit committee independence is important for its effectiveness. The more
independent the audit committee is, the more likely it is to be able to perform its financial
reporting oversight more effectively because the audit committee is not influenced by
management. The independence of the audit committee is important because it ensures
its objectivity (Kolins et al., 1991). In respect of board reliance on the audit committee,
Menon and Williams (1994) show that the proportion of independent directors on a board
is associated positively with the frequency of audit committee meetings. Thus, an audit
committee that is composed solely of independent directors should enhance its incentive
to oversee the financial reporting process and this is reflected by the new requirement by
the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, which was introduced in December 1999.
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The new requirement mandates all listed companies to maintain audit committees
consisting of at least three directors, all of whom have no relationship to the company
that could impair the exercise of their independence from management and the
company. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires firms in the USA to maintain an audit
committee composed solely of independent directors. The MCCG recommends that an
audit committee should consist of at least three directors, the majority of whom are
independent[4].
Empirical evidence shows that the audit committee is associated with better earnings
quality (Wild, 1994; Klein, 2002). Audit committee independence is also found to be
associated with fewer incidents of accounting errors, irregularities and illegal acts
(McMullen, 1993). It has also been shown that audit committee independence is
associated with a low likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. The presence of
an audit committee is also found to reduce the likelihood of profit overstatements
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Abbott et al., 2004). Abbott et al. (2004) find that the
independence and activity level of the audit committee are associated with a significant
and negative association with the occurrence of restatement. This is consistent with
their prediction where firms that conducted more audit meeting and discussion (at least
four times during the first misstatement year) have lower incidence of restatement.
In Malaysia, the argument of audit committee independence being associated with
monitoring effectiveness, as measured by its ability to constraint accrual management,
is not empirically supported (Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Saleh et al., 2005).
In a subsequent study among distressed firms, Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah (2004) also fail
to find a relation between audit committee independence and voluntary disclosure.
One reason for the insignificant findings in Malaysian studies is due to the fact that audit
committees in Malaysia are still very much influenced by management because prior to
the revision of the MCCG in 2007, there was no prohibition for the CEO or finance
director of the firm to serve on the audit committee. Further, establishing the audit
committee is seen as a matter of complying with Bursa Malaysia listing requirements.
Thus, an audit committee in Malaysia lacks rigor. Consistent with the development in
the USA, the revised MCCG (Finance Committee, 2007) stipulates that all committee
members be non-executive directors, be financially literate and the MCCG also stipulates
the frequency meetings. Nevertheless, the issue of the independence of the committee
members has been an issue of concern because it relates to audit committee effectiveness
and thus the role of committee independence to deter financial misstatement warrants
investigation. In the present study, the primary focus is on financial restatement.
Because financial restatement could adversely affect the reputation of the independent
audit committee members, especially when it involves irregularities and illegal acts, it is
predicted that independent audit committee members would play their role to avoid
these incidences. The hypothesis is as follows:
H3. There is a negative association between financial restatement and audit
committee independence.
Financial restatement and CEO duality
Board leadership refers to the division of powers between the board chairman and the
CEO. Combining these two roles weakens the firm’s internal corporate governance
systems where there is a conflict of interest between the monitor (i.e. the board chairman)
and the implementer of the board’s decisions (i.e. the CEO). Separating these two roles
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avoids resting excessive powers in the hand of the chairman-cum-CEO rendering the
board as a whole ineffective. This is because combining these two roles provides an
opportunity to the CEO to pursue his interest rather than the shareholders’ interests
( Jensen, 1993; Boyd, 1994). Rechner (1989) suggests that the ideal corporate governance
structure is one in which the board is composed of a majority of outside directors,
a chairman who is an outside director and argues that the weakest corporate governance
is where the board is dominated by insider directors and the CEO holds the
chairmanship of the board. In fact, Jensen (1993, p. 866) argues that “for the board to be
effective, it is important to separate the CEO and chairman positions”. Dechow et al.
(1996) find that earning manipulators are more likely to have a company founder as CEO
and are more likely to have a CEO who also serves as the Chairman of the Board.
The separation should provide greater incentives to the non-executive chairman to
act in the interest of the shareholders rather than to protect the interest of the CEO.
Brown and Caylor (2004) provide evidence that shows the separation of chairman and
CEO is associated with a higher firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, indicating a
favorable market view of the separation of the board chairman and CEO. Efendi et al.
(2004) further reveal that firms that restated financial statements had a weaker corporate
governance structure, whereby CEOs of restatement firms more frequently hold the
position of board chairmen. Having a non-executive chairman ensures that important
issues that relate to shareholders’ interests are covered adequately in board meetings.
If the CEO is also the board chairman, he/she would control and determine the agenda of
board meetings and might not disclose important information adequately to enable the
board to assess the performance of the CEO appropriately (Abdullah, 2004). However,
separating the board chairman and CEO roles can be good for shareholders (Conyon and
Peck, 1998; Dahya, 2004; Cheng and Courtney, 2006; Faleye, 2007). Despite the mixed
results, the consensus among the shareholder activists, institutional investors and
regulators is that it is a good practice to separate the top two roles, as reflected in
various codes on corporate governance. Additionally, Marciukaityte et al. (2009)
suggested that CEO dominance could compromise board objectivity. In fact, MCCG
(Finance Committee, 2001, 2007) recommends firms to separate the top two roles.
The hypothesis is thus as follows:
H4. There is a positive association between financial restatement and CEO
duality.
Financial restatement and managerial ownership
The pattern of a firm’s ownership signals the firm’s agency costs and the extent of
monitoring of management. Two issues that are associated with firm’s ownership
structure is the extent of managerial ownership and large shareholders. Managerial
ownership mitigates the agency conflicts ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and thus leads to
higher earnings informativeness (Warfield et al., 1995). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue
that a diffused ownership structure creates conflicts between owners and managers
because managers do not always act in the best interest of shareholders. In a diffused
ownership firm, agency problems are predictably acute. In Malaysia, firm’s shares are
heavily concentrated among a few individuals or institutions (La Porta et al., 1999;
Abu-Bakar, 2001). Thus, in Malaysia and in other East Asia countries, the conflict is not
solely between owner-manager as agency theory argues to exist, but rather between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders or “principal-principal” conflict
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(Young et al., 2008b). The public therefore perceives that the controlling owners report
accounting information for their own purposes rather than for other shareholders
and thus outside shareholders lose confidence in the reported earnings (Fan and Wong,
2002). Managerial ownership mitigates agency costs, as argued by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). Conversely, substantial managerial ownership could lead to management
entrenchment (Weston, 1979; Stulz, 1988) and is associated with controlling owners
holding up minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002). Thus, this could be
counter-productive. Hence, mitigating the agency costs is only achieved when managers
own up to a certain level of shares, beyond which minority shareholders are
disadvantageous. This is in fact the findings by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and
Servaes (1990).
The extent of managerial ownership is expected to be associated with financial
restatement because managerial ownership indicates the extent to which managers are
being truthful to other shareholders. As argued by Fan and Wong (2002), managers who
own substantial shares have the incentives to hold up other shareholders by not
disclosing important information. However, the relationship may not be linear; rather it
is curvilinear (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Warfield et al., 1995).
At the lower levels of managerial ownership, managers are expected to be truthful to the
other shareholders because they are being monitored by other shareholders. Thus, the
financial statements are expected to be free of errors or irregularities. However, when
managers own substantial shares, they are expected to dominate the firm. They would
have greater incentives to show to other shareholders that the firm has performed very
well financially. These incentives are achieved by inflating revenues and thereby profits.
Thus, accounting errors and irregularities leading to financial restatements are expected
to be high when managerial ownership is high. Evidence in Singapore, whose firm’s
ownership patterns resemble to that of Malaysia, supports a curvilinear relationship
between managerial ownership and earnings management; negative relation when
managerial ownership is between 0 and 25 percent and positive relation when ownership
is beyond 25 percent (Yeo et al., 2002). Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:
H5. There is a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and
financial restatement, negative at lower levels and positive at higher
managerial ownership levels.
Financial restatement and outside blockholders
Outside blockholders, who hold substantial shares, play important monitoring roles
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Admati et al., 1994; Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998;
Noe, 2002). The greater incentives for outsiders to monitor management arise due to the
fact that their wealth is tied directly to the firms and they have the necessary resources to
monitor closely their investments. In fact, in the year prior to the 1997 financial crisis,
about 37 percent of Malaysian firm shares were held by the firm’s largest shareholder
(Abdullah, 2002). La Porta et al. (1999) also report that blockholdings and institutional
shareholdings account, average, 54 percent of shares in the ten largest firms in Malaysia
and 49 percent in ten largest firms in Singapore compared to 20 percent in ten largest
firms in the USA.
Dechow et al. (1996) find earning manipulators are less likely to have outside
blockholders. The importance of outside blockholders to monitor arises because of
the influence of these outside blockholders on the share price of the firms and the ability
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of these investors, by virtue of the shares they hold, to determine the decisions made by
the board. If these outside blockholders decide to sell the firm’s shares in large quantity,
the firm’s share price will be adversely affected. Further, they are commonly represented
on the firm’s board and thus are influential in determining the direction of board
meetings. Therefore, the presence of outside blockholders provides an important
monitoring mechanism to ensure management acts in the interest of the shareholders.
Acting in the shareholder’s interest requires management to provide shareholders
with financial statements, which are true and fair and free from errors or irregularities.
The fact that these blockholders including institutional investors, compared to retail
investors, are expected to be sophisticated and thus are able to determine whether the
financial statements have been prepared in a manner that would give the firm “true” and
“fair” view. Furthermore, these outside blockholders have the resources required to
monitor the firm’s management.
However, empirical evidence in Singapore supports the earlier contention where
outside unrelated blockholders are associated with lower incidence of earnings
management (Yeo et al., 2002). Thus, the likelihood of financial restatement is expected
to be low with presence of outside blockholders due to better monitoring of management.
The maintained hypothesis is thus:
H6. There is a negative association between financial restatement and extent of
ownership by outside shareholders.
Three control variables are included in the analyses. First, auditor independence is one
of the control variables. Audit by a Big 4 auditor indicates that the work done by this
auditor produce a high quality audit compared to a non Big 4 firm. It is argued that their
audit procedures are more structured and systematically organized and there is a greater
chance to discover accounting errors. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) propose that larger
audit firms have a greater economic interest in ensuring the financial statement is
free from material errors. Their evidence shows that the relationship between Big 8
(now Big 4) and overstatement errors is negatively related. Another control variable is a
firm’s probability of bankruptcy. Companies that have a financial problem are more
likely to manipulate earnings, make errors and create losses to the users (Palmrose and
Scholz, 2000). Altman (1968) Z-score is be used to measure a firm’s bankruptcy
probability. Abbott et al. (2004) also use Altman Z as an indicator of troubled companies.
They predict that weak financial position could lead management to restate the financial
statement in the subsequent financial year. Finally, the third control variable is the
firm’s debt level, which has been found to be associated with restatement (Dechow et al.,
1996; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Richardson et al., 2002). The debt level indicates the
risk and the extent of debt covenants imposed on the firm. Thus, there is a higher
likelihood of misstating the accounts in the presence of high debt level.
Research method
Sample selection and variable measurement
The population of this study covers all companies listed on the main board and the
second board of Bursa Malaysia for the following years: 2002 (total listed firms: 856),
2003 (total listed firms: 874), 2004 (total listed firms: 900) and 2005 (total listed firms: 914).
We started with the 2002 financial year because during this period, the 1997/1998
financial crisis was already over and the economy had started to recover. Thus, the
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confounding effect of the crisis is not present in the sample because the crisis was
declared over in 1999. Further, MCCG had already been effective for two years.
Companies involved in finance, trust, close-end funds, real estate investment trusts and
exchange traded funds were excluded from the final sample, as they are subject to their
own industry’s rules and regulations.
Corporate governance variables and financial data were collected from the sample
company’s annual report and Datastream. Firms that restated their financial statements
in corporate annual reports during the period of 2002-2005 were first identified. In so
doing, keywords of “restatement”, “restate”, “restated”, or “prior year adjustments” were
searched in each annual report for evidence of restatement. As a result, we included only
31 firm-years companies which were deemed to have restated their annual reports
according to the GAO’s definition (refer to the Appendix, Table AI for GAO’s definition
of restatements). A sample of a control group was subsequently formed using the
match-pair procedures. The control group consists of firms which did not restate their
accounts, had a similar financial year end, classified in the same Bursa Malaysia
sectorial classification, about the same size as the matched restated firm, and listed on
the same Bursa Malaysia board. The matching process yielded 62 sample firm-years,
which consists of 31 restating companies and 31 matched control companies. A similar
procedure was followed by Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) where they used industry and
company size for matching process between restatement firms and non restatement
firms.
Dichotomous variables were used for: nomination committee independence (“1” if all
members are independent directors, and “0” otherwise), audit committee independence
(“1” if all audit committee members are independent, “0” otherwise), CEO duality (“1” if
the posts of board chairman and CEO are combined, “0” otherwise) and audit quality
(“1” if the auditor is a Big 4 auditor, “0” otherwise). Nomination committee and audit
committee independence is treated as a dichotomous variable because it is argued that
only when these committees are wholly composed of independent directors are they
effective. This is consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the UK Combined
Code (Finance Reporting Council, 2008). Meanwhile, board independence is measured by
the percentage of independent directors on the board; whereas managerial ownership is
based from percentage the shares held by executive directors (both direct and indirect
interests) relative to the firm’s total shares. The outside blockholder share ownership is
measured as the cumulative shareholdings (in percentage of shares) of outside investors,
including institutional investors whose ownership is in excess of 2 percent (both direct
and indirect interests) relative to the firm’s total shares. Finally, the probability of
bankruptcy is computed using the Altman Z; while the gearing ratio is derived at by
dividing total debts over total assets. The hypotheses are tested using logistic regression
analysis.
Results and discussion
The sample selection procedures are presented in Table II. The sample consists of all
non-finance companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia on both main and second boards for
the 2002-2005 years, inclusive.
The number of firms that restated the annual reports, on a year to year basis, was
fairly constant during 2002-2005 periods, representing less than 1 percent of the listed
firms. Thus, it could be concluded that the incidence is not high. Nevertheless,
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the incidence of restatement is not predicted to be random. Companies from a certain
industry may be more prone to restate their accounts. To understand this, the companies
were classified according to the Bursa Malaysia industrial sectors, the results of which
are shown in Table III.
It is noted that almost half of the restatement companies were classified under trading
and services. Construction firms, on the other hand, made up the least number of
restatement firms. Thus, companies from trading and services sector appear to be more
prone to restatements than companies from other sectors. Table IV presents the number
of incidents of restatements according to the GAO’s definition.
Almost 40 percent of the firms restated the costs or expenses. Restatements involving
revenue recognition accounted for 14 percent of the total restatements. These two
categories of restatements are presumably intended to manipulate the reported income.
Thus, this finding is consistent with the primary motive of misstatements which is
to increase the reported income as argued by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991).
The descriptive statistics is presented in Table V.
Results in Panel A of Table V indicate that, on average, more than one-third of the
board of directors of firms in the sample is composed of independent directors, thus
complying with MCCG requirements. It is also found that the audit committees of
the firms that restated the accounts are composed wholly of independent directors.
The difference in the independence of the audit committees of these sub-samples
Year
Item 2002 2003 2004 2005
Main board companies 562 598 622 646
Second board companies 294 276 278 268
Total number of companies 856 874 900 914
Less finance companies 59 50 52 46
Less trust companies 3 3 3 0
Less close-end fund companies 1 1 1 2
Less real estate investment trust companies 0 0 0 6
Less exchange-traded funds 0 0 0 1
Total number of listed companies observed 793 820 844 860
Number of companies found as a result of a keyword search 440 560 391 269
Less restatement not within GAO’s definition of restatement 433 554 384 258
Total restatement companies 7 6 7 11a
Percentages from the population 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.2
Note: aOne of the companies had restatement in 2004 as well
Table II.
Sample selection
procedures
Industrial classification 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total %
Trading and services 4 2 1 7 14 45
Consumer products 2 1 3 9.7
Properties 2 2 1 5 16
Industrial products 1 2 3 1 7 23
Constructions 1 1 2 6
Total 7 6 8 10 31 100
Table III.
Restatements based on
Bursa Malaysia sectorial
classification
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is statistically significant (t ¼ 2.24, p , 0.05). Nevertheless, the fact that the audit
committees of the firms that restated the accounts are more independent than the firms
that did not restate the accounts contradicts the prediction that an audit committee that
is independent is more effective in discharging its duties. Thus, based on this evidence,
audit committee independence does not play a role in deterring misstatement, consistent
with prior findings (Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Saleh et al., 2005;
Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah, 2004). As predicted, in Panel B, the nomination committees of
the firms that restated is less independent that that of the non-restating firms and the
difference is statistically significant (t ¼ 23.78, p , 0.05). Similarly, fewer restating
than non-restating firms employ Big 4 auditors.
Managerial ownership is found be higher for the firms that restated their accounts that
have no-restatement (Panel A). One explanation for this finding is that firms that restated
the accounts are mostly family-owned. Family-owned firms tend to be less transparent
compared to non-family firms, consistent with the earlier evidence in Singapore
(Hossain et al., 1994; Fan and Wong, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003). The percentage of share
ownership by outside blockholders is significantly higher (t ¼ 22.51, p , 0.05) among
firms that do not restate the accounts. Results in Panel A of Table V also show that
the performance of restating firms is significantly lower (t ¼ 21.70, p , 0.10) than the
performance of the non-restating firms, as indicated by the Z-score[5]. This evidence
suggests that a possible reason for misstating the accounts was to inflate earnings. This
is consistent with the results in Table IV, where 87 percent of the restatement involved
misstatement relating to costs or expenses (39 percent), revenue recognition (14 percent)
and other types[6] (34 percent). It is also noted that firms that restated their accounts have
higher level of gearing ratio compared to the firms that did not restate accounts. To test
the correlation between independent variables, the Pearson correlation analysis was
carried out, the results of which are presented in Table VI.
Results in Table VI indicate a strong correlation between board independence and
audit committee independence. This strong and positive correlation is not unexpected
and this is consistent with Klein (2002). A strong and strong correlation is also observed
between managerial ownership and outside blockholder ownership. However, the
correlation is less than 0.8, the threshold for the presence a severe collinearity as
suggested by Cooper and Schindler (1998).
Results on logistic regression analysis are shown in Table VII. In Panel A, the
regression model included only the hypothesized variables. In Panel B, three control
variables were included in the model, namely audit quality, gearing ratio and Z-score[7].
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total incidents of restatement %
Cost or expense 2 8 2 5 17 39
Other 3 2 5 5 15 34
Revenue recognition – 5 – 1 6 14
Restructuring, assets or inventory 1 1 0 2 4 9
Acquisitions and mergers 1 – – – 1 2
Reclassification – 1 – – 1 2
Total number of restatements 7 17 7 13 44 100
Note: The number of incidents (i.e. 44) is different from 31 (in Table II) because certain companies
gave more than one reason for restatement
Table IV.
Reasons of restatements
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In Panel A, except for managerial ownership and the square of managerial ownership,
there is no evidence of severe multicollinearity between independent variables as the
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are less than ten. The VIFs for managerial ownership
and the square of managerial ownership variables are more than ten because they are
basically the same variable. Results in Panel A of Table VII show that only H6 is
supported. Thus, the extent of shares owned by outside blockholders is associated
negatively with restatement. The evidence thus indicates that the extent of ownership
by outside blockholders constraint managers from misstating accounts which
subsequently require restatement. Hence, outside blockholders are effective in
controlling management’s opportunistic behaviors, supporting previous evidence
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Admati et al., 1994; Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998; Noe,
2002; Yeo et al., 2002). Audit committee independence is significantly ( p , 0.05)
associated with financial restatement, but not in the hypothesized direction. However,
this finding is consistent with the previous findings in Malaysia where audit committee
independence has been found to be not associated with its effectiveness
(Mohd-Saleh et al., 2007; Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004; Mohd-Nasir and Abdullah,
2004) and in the USA (Baber et al., 2005), Thus, as the evidence suggests, audit committee
independence leads to financial misstatements, suggesting that audit committee
independence is ineffective and counter-productive. Two explanations could be given
for such a finding. First, the formation of the audit committee in Malaysia is mandatory
and there is no provision requiring it is composed wholly of independent directors.
Further, the audit committee chairman is not required to be independent, which may
impede the effectiveness of the audit committee. Further, prior to 2007, it is customary
for the managing director (or the finance director) of the firm to sit on the audit
committee. This could have adversely affected the audit committee effectives. Second, it
is the issue audit committee expertise in accounting. Prior to 2007, the requirement was
that only one member should be expert in accounting. The audit committee will not be
effective unless the audit committee members are qualified who understand the
accounting standards.
The other four hypotheses are not supported. The directions of the association are as
predicted, but they are not statistically significant. The ineffectiveness of the
independence of the board of directors seems to be consistent with previous mixed
findings on this issue (Wan-Hussin et al., 2003; Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004;
Mohd-Saleh et al., 2005, Mohd-Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) and on the incidents of
restatement in the USA (Baber et al., 2005). Thus, the independence of the board
of directors does not mean the board being expert, diligent, vigilant, or strict as a
monitor of management as argued in agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Variable BDIND NOMIND ACIND DUAL MGOWN OUTBLK
BDIND 1.000 0.037 0.530 * 0.012 20.002 20.168 * *
NOMIND 1.000 20.010 0.063 0.162 20.107
ACIND 1.000 20.135 0.050 20.163
DUAL 1.000 0.357 * 20.177
MGOWN 1.00 20.727 *
OUTBLK 1.00
Notes: *p , 0.05; * *p , 0.10, two-tailed test; n ¼ 62
Table VI.
Pearson correlation
matrix
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Kosnik, 1987, 1990; Weisbach, 1988; Beasley, 1996). Rather, independent directors on the
board may serve as provider of service and “window to the world” for the firm (Pfeffer,
1972). Thus, the role of independent directors in Malaysia is mainly to provide
independent views to the board rather than to monitor management.
Managerial ownership is also not found to have any association with the incident of
financial restatement, consistent with earlier evidence in the USA (Baber et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, Mohd-Ghazali and Weetman (2006) reveal that executive directors’
ownership and disclosure are negatively associated. Hence, both findings suggest that
managerial ownership does not mitigate agency costs. The average managerial
ownership among the sample firms in the present study is high, i.e. at 25 percent.
Hence, managerial ownership is a tool for managerial entrenchment hypothesis
(Bebchuk et al., 2009).
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient SE p-value VIF
Panel A – Without control variables
Constant Indeterminate 2.530 2.121 0.233
BDIND Negative 21.944 2.810 0.245 1.479
NOMIND Negative 20.004 1.267 0.497 1.031
ACIND Negative 2.503 1.227 0.020 * 1.481
DUAL Positive 0.002 0.0.871 0.499 1.412
MGOWN Negative 20.038 0.074 0.319 14.346
MGOWN2 Positive 0.001 0.001 0.304 11.570
OUTBLK Negative 20.043 0.023 0.033 * 2.620
Overall percentage of correct prediction 80.6%
Nagelkerke R 2 0.579
Panel B: With control variables
Constant Indeterminate 1.802 2.507 0.472
BDIND Negative 22.119 3.090 0.246
NOMIND Negative 20.004 1.34 0.499
ACIND Negative 4.933 2.288 0.016 *
DUAL Positive 0.002 9.698 0.499
MGOWN Negative 20.022 0.033 0.255
OUTBLK Negative 20.029 0.026 0.127
AUDQ Negative 20.092 1.045 0.455
Z-score Negative 20.587 0.498 0.123
GRG Positive 1.680 0.799 0.017 *
Overall percentage of correct prediction 87.1%
Nagelkerke R 2 0.720
Notes: *p , 0.05, * *p , 0.10, two-tailed tests; n ¼ 62
Model : lnðR=12 RÞ¼a02b1·BDIND2b2·NOMIND2b3·ACINDþ b4·DUAL þ b5·MGMOWN2
b6·OUTBLK2 b7·AUDQ2 b8·Z þ b9·GRG þ 1,
where R, “1” if restatement and “0” no restatement; BDIND, board independence, ratio of independent
directors to the board size; NOMIND, nomination committee independence, dummy variable, “1” if all
members are independent directors and “0” otherwise; ACIND, audit committee independence, “1” if all
audit committee members are independent, “0” otherwise; DUAL, CEO duality, “1” if the posts of
board chairman and CEO are combined, “0” otherwise; MGOWN, percentage of shares held by
executive directors (both direct and indirect interests); OUTBLK, percentage of shares held by outside
investors in excess of 2 percent (both direct and indirect interests); AUDQ, auditor quality, “1” if the
auditor is a Big 4 auditor, “0” otherwise; Z, probability of bankruptcy, based on Altman Z-score; GRG,
ratio of total debt to total assets
Table VII.
Logistic regression
results
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Another variable that does not have a significant association with financial
restatement is leadership structure, which is consistent with the evidence in the USA
(Baber et al., 2005). One explanation for this finding could be due to the fact that
separating the roles of the board chairman and CEO is required by the MCCG. Thus,
almost all firms, except four firms, separated the roles.
Finally, the independence of nominating committee is not related to financial
restatement. One explanation for the insignificance is due to the fact that nominating
committee is not very well established in the Malaysian corporate governance
framework compared to board independence and audit committee independence. Unlike
in other developed countries such as UK or USA, the issue of nominating committee is
rarely discussed or debated. Only in the revised MCCG (Finance Committee, 2007) are
the roles of the nominating committee are clarified. Hence, prior to 2007, there was no
clear guidance on the role of the nominating committee.
Panel B of Table VII reports the logistic regression results with the inclusion of three
control variables. Results generally remain the same as in Panel A of Table VII, with the
exception of the gearing ratio. There is a positive and significant association between
gearing ratio and the probability of financial restatement ( p , 0.05). Thus, with the
presence of debt covenants, firms with high level of debts are more likely to commit in
financial misstatement. This is consistent with the earlier findings (Dechow et al., 1996;
Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Richardson et al., 2002).
Table VIII presents results from the logistic regression analyses by adding additional
three control variables, namely firm’s size, type of auditor’s opinion and board listing on
Bursa Malaysia.
Generally, results in all models in Table VIII are similar to those in Table VII.
In Model 1, it is found that firm’s size does not have any significant association with
the probability of financial restatement. In Model 2, the type of auditor’s opinion is
Variable Predicted sign
Model 1
(coefficient)
Model 2
(coefficient)
Model 3
(coefficient)
Constant Indeterminate 22.580 6.339 2.577
BDIND Negative 22.605 0.268 23.761
NOMIND Negative 20.004 0.003 20.004
ACIND Negative 5.251 * 4.766 5.485 *
DUAL Positive 0.002 0.002 0.002
MGOWN Negative 20.105 20.000 0.001
OUTBLK Negative 20.04 * * 20.059 * * 20.047 * *
AUDQ Negative 20.295 21.258 20.741
Z-score Negative 20.492 21.623 * * 21.013 *
GRG Positive 1.592 *
LNASSETa Negative 0.265 –
AUDOPINb Negative 25.136 * –
BRDLISTc Negative 2.135 * *
Percentage with correct prediction 87.1 91.9 91.9
Nagelkerke R 2 0.727 0.875 0.757
Notes: *p , 0.05, * *p , 0.10, two-tailed tests; aLNASSET, log natural of total assets; bAUDOPIN,
1 if “unqualified auditor’s report”; 0 if “otherwise”; cBRDLIST, 1 if “main board”; 0 if “otherwise”;
n ¼ 62
Table VIII.
Further logistic
regression results
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associated negatively and significantly with the likelihood of financial restatement
( p , 0.05). Thus, if the auditor’s report is other than “unqualified”, there is a higher
likelihood that financial misstatement has occurred in the accounts, and vice-versa.
Finally, in Model 3, board listing is associated positively and significantly ( p , 0.10)
with the incident of financial restatement. However, the evidence suggests that firms
that are listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia are more likely to misstate accounts
than firms in the Second Board.
Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of financial restatements among
Malaysian listed companies for the years 2002-2005 and to investigate whether the
corporate governance characteristics are associated with financial restatement. Using
a sample of 31 firms that restate their accounts and a matched control group of
31 non-restated firm years, the findings indicate that ownership by outside blockholders
is associated with less likelihood of financial misstatement. This shows that outside
blockholders is effective in disciplining managers so that the accounts so prepared are
not misleading. This finding thus supports the effective monitoring by outside
blockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Admati et al., 1994; Huddart, 1993;
Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002). The evidence is important because the ownership pattern
in Malaysia, like other East Asian countries, is such that about 50 percent of shares are
owned by institutional shareholders or blockholders (Claessens et al., 2000).
However, other corporate governance variables, namely board independence,
nomination committee independence, CEO duality and managerial ownership, do not
have any significant impact on the likelihood of financial restatement. This evidence is
consistent wit the findings on restatements in the USA (Baber et al., 2005). It could be
argued therefore that the presence of independent directors on the board is simply to
fulfill the MCCG’s one-third requirement on the board composition. In fact, it is also
found that audit committee independence is associated with higher likelihood of
financial restatement incidence, which is unexpected. Based on this evidence, the recent
changes in MCCG (Finance Committee, 2007) which require the audit committees be
composed of wholly independent audit committees who are financially literate could
improve audit committee vigilance and diligence.
The findings may serve as an input for the regulatory bodies in Malaysia on policy
deliberation or policy review in order to strengthen their roles in overseeing the
company and to curb the possibility of directors functioning as rubber stamp. This is
consistent with the new requirement in Companies (Amended) Act 2007 that requires
directors to exercise reasonable care, skills, and diligence at all times. It is further
hoped that the revised version of the MCCG would overcome the shortcomings
identified in the original version of the code to ensure an effective financial reporting
oversight by the various corporate governance players.
There are three main limitations in this study. First, the fact that the data are
cross-sectional could lead to the problem of endogeneity. Second, there may be other
factors that affect restatements but are not included in this study, such as audit
committee qualifications and tenure. Third, the results of this study may be not
applicable to other developing countries with a different structure of ownership and
regulations. Further, research on this issue could be undertaken in the future, such as to
investigate the incidence of restatements in quarterly financial reports. Furthermore,
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other corporate governance variables, like the frequency of audit committee meetings
and the effectiveness of the internal control system, can also be tested. Studies also can
be conducted to see the impacts of restatement announcement on the company’s shares
price in the Malaysian setting. Finally, a study could be carried out on the effect of share
options given to employees. Employee Share Option Schemes have been found to be an
influential factor of financial misstatement in USA. The question is whether this finding
also holds in Malaysia.
Notes
1. Financial restatement refers to correction of earlier misstated information found in the
previous year’s annual reports.
2. The SC is a body established by the Government with the responsibility to ensure fair,
transparent, and secure trading on the Malaysian capital market. The commission has the
power to order public listed companies to restate their financial statements if their financial
statements are deemed to be misleading. The SC also has the power to exercise other
enforcement actions including instituting civil proceedings, criminal prosecutions, and
levying compounds for the breaching of securities rules (Securities Commission, 2010).
3. Huron Consulting Group is an independent provider of financial and operational consulting
services based in Chicago, USA. Among the area of services provided by the Group
are litigation, disputes, investigations, regulatory compliance and financial distresses
(Source: www.huronconsultinggroup.com).
4. Effective from 2008, the revised MCCG recommends that audit committee be composed
solely of non-executive directors, majority of whom are independent. Further, all members
should be financially literate with at least one member being a member of an accounting
association or body.
5. Z ¼ 1.2 (working capital/total assets) þ 1.4 (retained earnings/total assets) þ 3.3 (earnings
before interest and taxes/total assets) þ 0.6 (market value of equity/book value of total
liabilities) þ 0.999 (sales/total assets).
6. According to GAO, other types of restatement include restatement due to insufficient
loan-loss provision, delinquent loans, loan write-offs, improper accounting for bad debts,
frauds or accounting irregularities.
7. The GRG and Z-score variables were transformed to reduce the skewness using rank
transformation by employing the Van der Waerden procedure in SPPS.
References
Abbott, J.L., Parker, S. and Peters, G.F. (2004), “Audit committee characteristics and
restatements”, Auditing, Vol. 23, pp. 69-87.
Abdullah, S.N. (2002), “Board of directors’ independence among Malaysian listed companies in
an emerging economy”, Utara Management Review, Vol. 3, pp. 27-46.
Abdullah, S.N. (2004), “Board composition, CEO duality and performance among Malaysian
listed companies”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 4, pp. 47-61.
Abdullah, S.N. and Mohd-Nasir, N. (2004), “Accrual management and the roles of boards of
directors and audit committees among Malaysian listed companies: evidence during the
Asian financial crisis”, IIUM Journal of Management and Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 49-80.
Abu-Bakar, F. (2001), “Corporate governance in financially troubled companies”,
paper presented at Seminar on Corporate Governance: Issues and Challenges,
Sintok, June 10.
Financial
restatements and
governance
545
Admati, A., Pfleiderer, P. and Zechner, J. (1994), “Large shareholder activism, risk sharing, and
financial market equilibrium”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, pp. 1097-130.
Agrawal, A. and Chadha, S. (2005), “Corporate governance and accounting scandals”, Journal of
Law & Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 371-406.
Aier, J.K., Comprix, J., Gunlock, M.T. and Lee, D. (2005), “The financial expertise of CFOs and
accounting restatements”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 19, pp. 123-36.
Akhigbe, A., Kudla, R.J. and Madura, J. (2005), “Why are some corporate earnings restatements
more damaging”, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 327-36.
Altman, E.I. (1968), “Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate
bankruptcy”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 589-609.
Arthaud-Day, M.L., Certo, S.T., Dalton, C.M. and Dalton, R. (2006), “A changing of the guard:
executive and director turnover following corporate financial restatements”, Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 49, pp. 1119-136.
Baber, W.R., Kang, S.H. and Liang, L. (2005), “Strong boards, management entrenchment and
accounting restatement”, working paper, George Washington University, Washington, DC,
available at: http://zsbapp.baruch.cuny.edu/download/Accountancy/BKLJuly20.pdf
(accessed February 24, 2010).
Beasley, M. (1996), “An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 71, pp. 443-65.
Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A. and Ferrell, A. (2009), “What matters in corporate governance?”,
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 783-827.
Boyd, B. (1994), “Board control and CEO compensation”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15,
pp. 277-97.
Brown, L.D. and Caylor, M.L. (2004), “Corporate governance and firm performance”,
working paper, available at: www.ssrn.com/abstract¼586423 (accessed July 10, 2007).
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement (2006), Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad,
available at: www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/regulation/rules/listing_requirements/
(accessed May 20, 2010).
Chan, K.H. and Mo, P.L.L. (1998), “Ownership effects on audit-detected error characteristics:
an empirical study in an emerging economy”, The International Journal of Accounting,
Vol. 33, pp. 235-61.
Cheng, E.C.M. and Courtney, S.M. (2006), “Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary
disclosure”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 41, pp. 262-89.
Chtourou, S.M., Bedard, J. and Courteau, L. (2001), “Corporate governance and earnings
management”, working paper, Universite Laval, Quebec.
Claessens, S., Dyankov, S. and Lang, L.H.P. (2000), “The separation of ownership and control in
East Asian corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 81-112.
Coffee, J.C.J. (2005), “A theory of corporate scandals: why the USA and Europe differ?”, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21, pp. 198-211.
Conyon, M.J. and Peck, S.I. (1998), “Board size and corporate performance: evidence from
European countries”, The European Journal of Finance, Vol. 4, pp. 291-304.
Cooper, D.R. and Schindler, P.S. (1998), Business Research Methods: Statistics and Probability
Series, 6th ed., McGraw-Hill International Edition, Singapore.
Dahya, J. (2004), “One man two hats – what’s all the commotion!”, working paper, Baruch
College, New York, NY.
MAJ
25,6
546
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G. and Sweeney, A.P. (1996), “Causes and consequences of earnings
manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC”,
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 13, pp. 1-36.
DeFond, M.L. and Jiambalvo, J. (1991), “Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors”,
The Accounting Review, Vol. 66, pp. 643-55.
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A. and Swanson, E.P. (2004), “Why do corporate managers misstate
financial statements? The role of option compensation, corporate governance and other
factors”, working paper, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, May 17.
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A. and Swanson, E.P. (2007), “Why do corporate managers misstate
financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors”, Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 85 No. 3, pp. 667-708.
Eilifsen, A. and Messier, W.F. (2000), “The incidence and detection of misstatements: a review
and integration of archival research”, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 19, pp. 1-43.
Eilifsen, A., Austen, L.A. and Messier, W.F. (2000), “Characteristics of auditor detected
misstatements: evidence from Norwegian audits”, working paper, Georgia State
University, Atlanta, GA.
Eng, L.L. and Mak, Y.T. (2003), “Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure”, Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 325-45.
Faleye, O. (2007), “Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure”, Journal of
Management and Governance, Vol. 11, pp. 239-59.
Fama, E. and Jensen, M.C. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law &
Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-26.
Fan, J.P.H. and Wong, T.J. (2002), “Corporate ownership and the informativeness of accounting
earnings in East Asia”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 401-25.
Finance Committee (2001), Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, Securities Commission,
Kuala Lumpur.
Finance Committee (2007), Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, Securities Commission,
Kuala Lumpur.
Finance Reporting Council (2008), The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, Finance
Reporting Council, London.
Flanagan, D.J., Muse, L.A. and O’Shaughnessy, K.C. (2008), “An overview of accounting
restatement activity in the United States”, International Journal of Commerce &
Management, Vol. 18, pp. 363-81.
GAO (2002), “Financial statement restatement: trends, market impacts, regulatory responses and
remaining challenges”, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, US Senate, Report 03-138, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
GAO (2006), Financial Restatement Database. Report 06-1053R, Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC.
Gul, F.A. and Leung, S. (2002), “Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary
disclosure”, Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, Vol. 23, pp. 1-29.
Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S. (1988), “The determinants of board composition”, RAND
Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 589-606.
Ho, S.S.M. and Wong, K.S. (2001), “A study of the relationship between corporate governance
structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure”, International Journal of Accounting,
Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 10, pp. 139-56.
Financial
restatements and
governance
547
Hossain, M., Tan, L.M. and Adams, M. (1994), “Voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital
market: some empirical evidence from companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 29, pp. 334-51.
Huddart, S. (1993), “The effects of a large shareholder on corporate value”, Management Science,
Vol. 39, pp. 1407-21.
Huron Consulting Group (2003), An Analysis of Restatement Matters: Rules, Errors, Ethics, for
the Five Years Ended December 31, 2002, Huron Consulting Group LLC, Chicago, IL,
available at: www.huronconsultinggroup.com/about.aspx (accessed March 11, 2008).
Huron Consulting Group (2005), Summary: 2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters,
Huron Consulting Group LLC, Chicago, IL.
Jensen, M.C. (1993), “The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control
systems”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 831-80.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-60.
Kinney, W. Jr and McDaniel, L. (1989), “Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported
quarterly earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 71-94.
Klein, A. (2002), “Audit committee, board of director characteristics and earnings management”,
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 375-400.
Kolins, W.A., Cangemi, M.P. and Tomasko, P.A. (1991), “Eight essential attributes of an audit
committee”, Internal Auditing, Vol. 7, pp. 3-18.
Kosnik, R.D. (1987), “Greenmail: a study of board performance in corporate governance”,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 32, pp. 163-85.
Kosnik, R.D. (1990), “Effects of board demography and directors’ incentives on corporate
greenmail decisions”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 33, pp. 129-50.
Ku-Ismail, K.N.I. and Abdullah, S.N. (2010), “The reliability of corporate quarterly financial
reporting in Malaysia: post-MASB 26 evidence”, Asian Journal of Accounting and Finance,
Vol. 2 No. 2 (in press).
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1999), “Corporate ownership
around the world”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 471-518.
Levitt, A. (1998), “The numbers game”, speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and
Business, New York, NY, September 28, available at: www.sec.gov
Liew, P. (2007), “Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia: the key leading players’
perspectives”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15, pp. 724-40.
Lin, J.W., Li, J.F. and Yang, J.S. (2006), “The effect of audit committee performance on earnings
quality”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 921-33.
McConnell, J.J. and Servaes, H. (1990), “Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate
value”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 595-612.
McMullen, D.A. (1993), “Audit committee structure and performance: an empirical investigation
of the consequences and attributes of audit committees”, doctoral dissertation, Drexel
University, Philadelphia, PA.
Mace, M.L. (1986), Directors: Myth and Reality, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Marciukaityte, D., Szewczyk, S.H. and Varma, R. (2009), “Voluntary vs forced financial
restatements: the role of board independence”, Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 65, pp. 51-65.
Maug, E. (1998), “Large shareholders as a monitor: is there a trade-off between liquidity and
control?”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, pp. 65-98.
MAJ
25,6
548
Menon, K. and Williams, J.D. (1994), “The use audit committees for monitoring”, Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 13, pp. 121-39.
Mohd-Ghazali, N.A. and Weetman, P. (2006), “Perpetuating traditional influences: voluntary
disclosure in Malaysia following the economic crisis”, Journal of International Accounting,
Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 226-48.
Mohd-Nasir, N. and Abdullah, S.N. (2004), “Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance
among financially distressed firms in Malaysia”, Financial Reporting, Regulation and
Governance, Vol. 3, pp. 95-139.
Mohd-Saleh, N., Mohd-Iskandar, T. and Rahmat, M.M. (2005), “Earnings management and board
characteristics: evidence from Malaysia”, Jurnal Pengurusan, Vol. 24, pp. 77-103.
Mohd-Saleh, N., Mohd-Iskandar, T. and Rahmat, M.M. (2007), “Audit committee characteristics
and earnings management: evidence from Malaysia”, Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 5
No. 2, pp. 147-63.
Moore, E.A. and Pfeiffer, R.J. (2004), “The effects of financial statement restatements on firms’
financial reporting strategies”, working paper, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA,
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼591333 (accessed September 25, 2007).
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988), “Management ownership and market valuation:
an empirical analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 293-315.
Myers, J.L., Myers, L.A. and Palmrose, Z.V. (2004), “Mandatory auditor rotation: evidence from
restatements”, working paper, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA,
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼443980 (accessed June 10, 2006).
Noe, T. (2002), “Institutional activism and financial market structure”, Review of Financial
Studies, Vol. 15, pp. 289-319.
Oh, E. (2005), “Wave of change in accounting standards”, The Star, May 21.
Palmrose, Z. and Scholz, S. (2000), “Restated financial statements and auditor litigation”,
working paper, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, available at: http://
ssrn.com/abstract¼248455 (accessed October 15, 2007).
Pascoe, J. and Rachagan, S. (2005), “Key developments in corporate law reform in Malaysia”,
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, July, pp. 93-113.
Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F. and Young, S.E. (2005), “Board monitoring and earnings management:
do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?”, Journal ofBusinessFinance&Accounting,
Vol. 32, pp. 1311-46.
Persons, O.S. (2005), “The relation between the new corporate governance rules and the likelihood
of financial statement fraud”, Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 4, pp. 125-48.
Pfeffer, J. (1972), “Size and composition of corporate boards of directors”, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 218-28.
Rechner, P.L. (1989), “Corporate governance: fact or fiction?”,Business Horizons, Vol. 32, pp. 11-15.
Richardson, S., Tuna, I. and Wu, M. (2002), “Predicting earnings management: the case of
earnings restatement”, working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, PA,
available at: http//ssrn.com.abstract¼338681 (accessed October 15, 2007).
Securities Commission (2002), “SC acts tough on errant PN4 directors; offenders will be deal
with”, available at: www.sc.com.my/ENG/HTML/resources/press/pr_20021212.html
(accessed March 21, 2005).
Securities Commission (2005), “SC reprimands Goh Ban Huat and its board of directors; key
directors fined for financial reporting deficiencies”, available at: www.sc.com.my/eng/
html/resources/press/pr_20050517.html (accessed June 15, 2006).
Financial
restatements and
governance
549
Securities Commission (2010), “Actions”, available at: www.sc.com.my/sub.
asp?pageid¼&menuid¼229&newsid¼&linkid¼&type = (accessed May 22, 2010).
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1986), “Large shareholders and corporate control”, Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 461-88.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance,
Vol. 52, pp. 737-83.
Sridharan, U.V., Caines, W.R., McMillan, J. and Summers, S. (2002), “Financial statement
transparency and auditor responsibility: Enron and Andersen”, International Journal of
Auditing, Vol. 6, pp. 277-86.
Srinivasan, S. (2005), “Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: evidence
from accounting restatements and audit committee members”, Journal of Accounting
Research, Vol. 43, pp. 291-334.
Stulz, R.M. (1988), “On takeover resistance, managerial discretion, and shareholders wealth”,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 25-54.
US Congress (2002), The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107th Congress of the United States of
America, H.R. 3763, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
Vafeas, N. (1999), “The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate
governance”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 26, pp. 199-225.
Wan-Hussin, W.N., Che-Adam, N., Lode, N.A. and Kamardin, H. (2003), “Early adoption of MASB
22 (segment reporting) by Malaysian listed companies”, Malaysian Accounting Review,
Vol. 2, pp. 139-52.
Warfield, T.D., Wild, J.J. and Wild, K.L. (1995), “Managerial ownership, accounting choices and
informativeness of earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 61-91.
Wei, C., Li, Z. and Li-chuan, T. (2008), “Does the system of independent directors help improve
the quality of accounting information: from the perspective of earnings conservatism”,
Chinese Business Review, Vol. 7, pp. 49-55.
Weisbach, M. (1988), “Outside directors and CEO turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 20, pp. 431-60.
Weston, J.F. (1979), “The tender takeover”, Mergers and Acquisition, Vol. 14, pp. 74-82.
Wild, J.J. (1994), “Managerial accountability to shareholders: audit committees and the
explanatory power of earnings for returns”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 26, pp. 353-74.
Wilson, W.M. (2008), “An empirical analysis of the decline in the information content of earnings
following restatements”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 83, pp. 519-48.
Yeo, H.H., Tan, M.S., Ho, K.W. and Chen, S.S. (2002), “Corporate ownership structure and the
informativeness of earnings”, Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, Vol. 29, pp. 833-63.
Young, C.S., Tsai, L.C. and Hsu, H.W. (2008a), “The effect of controlling shareholders’ excess
board seats control on financial restatements: evidence from Taiwan”, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30, pp. 297-314.
Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D. and Jiang, Y. (2008b), “Corporate
governance in emerging economies: a review of the principal-principal perspective”,
Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 45, pp. 196-220.
Further reading
Anderson, K.L. and Yohn, T.L. (2002), “The effect of 10-K restatements on firm value, information
asymmetries, and investors’ reliance on earnings”, working paper, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼332380 (accessed April 15, 2007).
MAJ
25,6
550
Finance Committee (1999), Report on Corporate Governance, Finance Committee on Corporate
Governance, Kuala Lumpur.
Ministry of Finance Malaysia (2007), Companies Act and Regulations (2007 ), MDC Publishers
Sdn Bhd, Kuala Lumpur.
(The Appendix follows overleaf.)
Corresponding author
Shamsul Nahar Abdullah can be contacted at: snahar@umt.edu.my
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
Financial
restatements and
governance
551
Appendix
C
at
eg
or
y
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
A
cq
u
is
it
io
n
s
an
d
m
er
g
er
s
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
of
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
s
or
m
er
g
er
s
th
at
w
er
e
im
p
ro
p
er
ly
ac
co
u
n
te
d
fo
r
or
n
ot
ac
co
u
n
te
d
fo
r
at
al
l.
T
h
es
e
in
cl
u
d
e
in
st
an
ce
s
in
w
h
ic
h
th
e
w
ro
n
g
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
m
et
h
od
w
as
u
se
d
or
lo
ss
es
or
g
ai
n
s
re
la
te
d
to
th
e
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
w
er
e
u
n
d
er
st
at
ed
or
ov
er
st
at
ed
.T
h
is
d
oe
s
n
ot
in
cl
u
d
e
in
-p
ro
ce
ss
re
se
ar
ch
an
d
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
or
re
st
at
em
en
ts
fo
r
m
er
g
er
s,
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
s,
an
d
d
is
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
op
er
at
io
n
s
w
h
en
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
m
et
h
od
s
w
er
e
em
p
lo
y
ed
C
os
t
or
ex
p
en
se
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
d
u
e
to
im
p
ro
p
er
co
st
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
.
T
h
is
ca
te
g
or
y
in
cl
u
d
es
in
st
an
ce
s
of
im
p
ro
p
er
ly
re
co
g
n
iz
in
g
co
st
s
or
ex
p
en
se
s,
im
p
ro
p
er
ly
ca
p
it
al
iz
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s,
or
an
y
ot
h
er
n
u
m
b
er
of
m
is
ta
k
es
or
im
p
ro
p
ri
et
ie
s
th
at
le
d
to
m
is
re
p
or
te
d
co
st
s.
It
al
so
in
cl
u
d
es
re
st
at
em
en
ts
d
u
e
to
im
p
ro
p
er
tr
ea
tm
en
t
of
ta
x
li
ab
il
it
ie
s,
in
co
m
e
ta
x
re
se
rv
es
,
an
d
ot
h
er
ta
x
-r
el
at
ed
it
em
s
In
-p
ro
ce
ss
re
se
ar
ch
an
d
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
re
su
lt
in
g
fr
om
in
st
an
ce
s
in
w
h
ic
h
im
p
ro
p
er
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
m
et
h
od
ol
og
ie
s
w
er
e
u
se
d
to
v
al
u
e
in
-
p
ro
ce
ss
re
se
ar
ch
an
d
d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
at
th
e
ti
m
e
of
an
ac
q
u
is
it
io
n
O
th
er
A
n
y
re
st
at
em
en
t
n
ot
co
v
er
ed
b
y
th
e
li
st
ed
ca
te
g
or
ie
s.
C
as
es
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
is
ca
te
g
or
y
in
cl
u
d
e
re
st
at
em
en
ts
d
u
e
to
in
ad
eq
u
at
e
lo
an
-l
os
s
re
se
rv
es
,
d
el
in
q
u
en
t
lo
an
s,
lo
an
w
ri
te
-o
ff
s,
or
im
p
ro
p
er
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
fo
r
b
ad
lo
an
s
an
d
re
st
at
em
en
ts
d
u
e
to
fr
au
d
,
or
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
ir
re
g
u
la
ri
ti
es
th
at
w
er
e
le
ft
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
R
ec
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
on
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
d
u
e
to
im
p
ro
p
er
ly
cl
as
si
fi
ed
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
it
em
s.
T
h
es
e
in
cl
u
d
e
re
st
at
em
en
ts
d
u
e
to
im
p
ro
p
ri
et
ie
s
su
ch
as
d
eb
t
p
ay
m
en
ts
b
ei
n
g
cl
as
si
fi
ed
as
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
R
el
at
ed
-p
ar
ty
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
d
u
e
to
in
ad
eq
u
at
e
d
is
cl
os
u
re
or
im
p
ro
p
er
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
of
re
v
en
u
es
,e
x
p
en
se
s,
d
eb
ts
,o
r
as
se
ts
in
v
ol
v
in
g
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
s
or
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s
w
it
h
re
la
te
d
p
ar
ti
es
.T
h
is
ca
te
g
or
y
in
cl
u
d
es
th
os
e
in
v
ol
v
in
g
sp
ec
ia
l
p
u
rp
os
e
en
ti
ti
es
R
es
tr
u
ct
u
ri
n
g
,
as
se
ts
,
or
in
v
en
to
ry
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
d
u
e
to
as
se
t
im
p
ai
rm
en
t,
er
ro
rs
re
la
ti
n
g
to
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
tr
ea
tm
en
t
of
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
,
ti
m
in
g
of
as
se
t
w
ri
te
-d
ow
n
s,
g
oo
d
w
il
l,
re
st
ru
ct
u
ri
n
g
ac
ti
v
it
y
,
an
d
in
v
en
to
ry
v
al
u
at
io
n
,
an
d
in
v
en
to
ry
q
u
an
ti
ty
is
su
es
R
ev
en
u
e
re
co
g
n
it
io
n
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
d
u
e
to
im
p
ro
p
er
re
v
en
u
e
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
.T
h
is
ca
te
g
or
y
in
cl
u
d
es
in
st
an
ce
s
in
w
h
ic
h
re
v
en
u
e
w
as
im
p
ro
p
er
ly
re
co
g
n
iz
ed
,
q
u
es
ti
on
ab
le
re
v
en
u
es
w
er
e
re
co
g
n
iz
ed
,
or
an
y
ot
h
er
n
u
m
b
er
of
m
is
ta
k
es
or
im
p
ro
p
ri
et
ie
s
th
at
le
d
to
m
is
re
p
or
te
d
re
v
en
u
e
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
re
la
te
d
R
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
d
u
e
to
im
p
ro
p
er
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
fo
r
d
er
iv
at
iv
es
,
w
ar
ra
n
ts
,
st
oc
k
op
ti
on
s
an
d
ot
h
er
co
n
v
er
ti
b
le
se
cu
ri
ti
es
N
o
te
:W
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
an
n
ou
n
ce
m
en
ts
in
v
ol
v
in
g
st
oc
k
sp
li
ts
,c
h
an
g
es
in
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
p
ri
n
ci
p
le
s,
an
d
ot
h
er
fi
n
an
ci
al
st
at
em
en
tr
es
ta
te
m
en
ts
th
at
w
er
e
n
ot
m
ad
e
to
co
rr
ec
t
m
is
ta
k
es
in
th
e
ap
p
li
ca
ti
on
of
ac
co
u
n
ti
n
g
st
an
d
ar
d
s
S
o
u
rc
e
:
G
A
O
(2
00
6)
Table AI.
GAO’s restatement
category description
MAJ
25,6
552
